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CHARLES KANNENGIESSER
That Augustine was an original thinker and a gifted writer was readily
acknowledged by his contemporaries. Christian and pagan alike. His
boyhood teacher in Madaura, the grammarian Maximus, writing to
Augustine in 391 shortly after his appointment as assistant to bishop
Valerius of Hippo, celebrated "that vigorous eloquence which has brought
you to universal fame."^ At the core of this eloquence Maximus could have
identified Cicero's paradigmatic legacy. Even sacred scripture when
recommended to the convert from Africa by the learned bishop Ambrose of
Milan had to comply with the undisputed authority of Cicero in Augustine's
mind. The reading of scripture appeared "to be unworthy if compared with
the dignity of Cicero," the bishop of Hippo recollected a decade later in his
Confessions?-
No such cult of literary devotees ever developed around Quintilian in
Latin Christian literature. "After two centuries of oblivion, . . . Quintilian
regained recognition during the fourth century, mainly among grammarians
like Diomedus. In the period of the third through the fifth century he was
imitated and quoted by Christian authors, such as Lactantius, Hilary of
Poitiers, Rufinus and Sidonius ApoUinaris."^ Among his contemporaries,
Juvenal mentions him three times in his Satires (6. 75, 280, 7. 185-96) and
Martial invokes him in one of his Epigrams (2. 90). He was also known to
the author of the Historia Augusta, as well as to Ausonius.'* So much for a
rather discreet Nachleben in late antiquity.^ Therefore it is the more
intriguing to find a replica of the Roman rhetor's notion of regula in the
^
"Facundiae robore atque exploso, qua cunctis clams es," Saint Augustine. Select Letters,
ed. by J. H. Baxter. Loeb Qassical Library (London and Cambridge, MA 1930) 18-19 (no. 5 =
Ep. 16).
^ Conf. 3. 5. 9 "(ilia scriptura) uisa est mihi indigna, quam Tullianae dignitati conpararem."
^ E. Bolaffi, La critica filosofica e letteraria in Quiniiliano, Collection Latomus 30 (Brussels
1958) 8.
* The latter mentions Quintilian in the opening of his Convnemoratio professorum Burdi-
galensium (1. 2, 16) and in the poem Mosella (404); O. Seel, Quintilian, oder Die Kunst des
Redens und Schweigens (Stuttgart 1977) 231^0.
* For Hilary, see also F. Barone. "QuintiUanus et Hilarius," VUa Latina 78 (1980) 10-15 (in
Latin).
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central rhetorical notion with which Tyconius operated in the late fourth
century.
Tyconius^ was the author of the earliest systematic attempt known to us
of a scriptural hermeneutics inside Christian traditions^ Augustine disliked
that schismatic fellow Christian from Africa, but he admired his work, in
particular The Book ofRules, which he quoted extensively in his essay On
Christian Doctrine. Hence the three parts of my paper. First, I must
establish the proper status and meaning of regula in Quintilian's Institutio
oratorio} Secondly, I should outline the use of regula in the work of
Tyconius. Thirdly, it would be my contention that the Ciceronian genius of
the former rhetor Augustine did not allow the elderly bishop Augustine to
acknowledge the proper value of regula, as taken over by Tyconius from
Quintilian. My conclusion would be that we have to deal here with a failed
opportunity in the otherwise very fertile history of biblical interpretation in
Roman Africa.'
I. Quintilian's Regula Loquendi
In Book 1 of the Institutio the three main qualities of a speech, considered
as a whole, are said to be "correctness, lucidity and elegance" («/ emendata,
ut dilucida, ut ornata sit 1. 5. 1). Quintilian adds the following advice:
"The teacher of literature therefore must study the rule for correctness of
speech (loquendi regula), this constituting the first part of his art."
Loquendi regula, in the singular, repeats partially the parallel statement by
which the previous chapter of Book 1 had been introduced: "Haec igitur
professio, cum breuissime in duas partes diuidatur, recte loquendi scientiam
et poetanim enarrationem, plus habet in recessu quam fronte promittit" (1.
4. 2). Both phrases, loquendi scientia and loquendi regula, belong to initial
statements introducing a presentation of what grammar is all about. They
function as formal definitions of the whole matter under scrutiny.
In chapter 6 of Book 1 Quintilian pleads in favor of correctness of style
in spoken as much as in written language. He starts, in 1. 6. 1, by a general
statement, comparable with the one which we noted above in 1. 4. 2, and in
^ P. Bright, "Tyconius," in Encyclopedia of Early Christianity (New York and London
1990) 917-18; E. Romero Pose, "Tichonius," in Encyclopedia of the Early Church (Cambridge
1992) (= Dizionario Patristico e di Antichitd Cristiane [1983-88]) D 838-39; M. EXilaey.
"Tyconius," in Dictionnaire de Spiritualite XV (Paris 1991) 1349-56.
P. Brighl's The Book of Rules of Tyconius: Its Purpose and Inner Logic (Noire Dame
1988) presents a first comprehensive analysis of the Book of Rules, a critical edition of which
had been secured by F. C. Burkett as early as 1894.
* J. Cousin, Etudes sur Quintilien (Paris 1936); G. Kennedy, Quintilian (New York 1969); J.
J. Murphy, QuirUilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing, transl. from Bodes 1, 2 and 10
of the Institutio Oratoria (Carbondale, IL 1987).
C. Kannengiesser and P. Bright, A Conflict of Christian Hermeneutics in Roman Africa:
Tyconius and Augustine, Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modem Culture,
Colloquy 58 (Berkeley 1989). In what follows, Quintilian is quoted in the traslation of H. E.
BuUer, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, MA 1920-22).
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any case significant of his love for correct speech: Sermo constat ratione,
uetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine, "Language is based on reason,
antiquity, authority and usage." By "reason" (ratio), as he adds at once,
correct speech rests mainly on the appropriate treatment of "analogy" and
sometimes of "etymology." He examines the role of etymologies from 1 . 6.
28 on, first in a more general way (28-31), secondly in specific cases (32-
38). In 1. 6. 33 he observes that etymology can help sometimes to identify
the proper meaning of words, even when words differ only by a single
letter, as in the case of "tegula, regula, and the like." Small matters of that
sort make sense, ponders Quintilian, if only one keeps being interested in
the logic behind the play of words. For etymology helps to catch precisely
the ratio of a name, or of a given spelling. Once more, regula, in the
singular, seems to cross Quintilian's mind at the precise moment when he
discusses some fundamental procedure of language.
Still in 1. 6, where "usage" is pondered in common language, after the
discussion of etymologies and archaic words, Quintilian becomes candidly
exhortative when he remarks that "here the critical faculty is necessary, and
we must make up our minds what we mean by usage" (1. 6. 43). With
professional fervor he concludes: "So too in speech we must not accept as a
rule of language {pro regula sermonis accipiendum) words and phrases that
have become a vicious habit with a number of persons" (1.6. 44). The
lovers of amended language do not conform to the practice of the common
people. That would be "a very dangerous prescription" (periculosissimum
praeceptum). "1 will therefore define usage in speech as the agreed practice
of educated men": Ergo consuetudinem sermonis uocabo consensum
eruditorum (1. 6. 45). In other words, consistent correctness of speech
{ratio) rests on education, and education calls for a tradition of learning: It
presupposes the consensus eruditorum}^
1. 7. 1 follows immediately 1. 6. 45, completing by some comple-
mentary remarks on faultless spelling what has just been stated for oral
speech: "Having stated the rule which we must follow in speaking, I will
now proceed to lay down the rule which we must observe when we write;
let us style it the science of writing correctly" ("Nunc, quoniam diximus,
quae sit loquendi regula, dicendum, quae scribentibus custodienda, quod
Graeci opGoypacpCav uocant; hoc nos recte scribendi scientiam
nominemus"). The perfect equivalence between regula (always recurring in
the singular) and scientia in such statements is highly significant. In 1. 5. 1,
loquendi regula had paralleled loquendi scientia from the initial sentence of
1. 4. 2. Here, loquendi regula and scribendi scientia impose a similar
normativity on the oral and the written level of communication. Finally,
when recapitulating chapters 5 to 8 on grammar, Quintilian chooses again in
'" V. Bonmati Sanchez, "Norma y uso segun Quintiliano," Revista Espanola de Unguistica
18 (1988) 343-45, shows that usus means consensus eruditorum based on the authority of
books.
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1. 9. 1 the phrase ratio loquendi, which echoes his use oi ratio in 1. 6. 1: Et
finitae quidem sunt partes dime, quas haec professio polUcetur, id est ratio
loquendi et enarratio auctorum, quarum illam methodicen hanc historicen
uocant, "I have now finished with two of the departments, with which
teachers of literature profess to deal, namely the art of speaking correctly
and the interpretation of authors; the former they call methodice, the latter
historice."
The ratio loquendi, "correctness of speech," is as much an objective
reality as the enarratio auctorum, the "interpretation of authors," when one
considers both of them in their social dimension. Both activities aim at a
well-defined allegiance to the normative tradition by which a language, oral
or written, remains integrally secured in a given society. Regula, in any
case, does not mean a "grammatical rule" in the modem sense. It has a
completely different extension, bound as it is to the cultural institution of
human speech in an educated society. In fact, it means that very institution
of educated language in its most immediate and vital exercise, namely the
correct spelling of words and the sound formation of sentences.
In the final section of his immense work, when Quintilian starts using
again the concept of regula, the ample and fundamental significance of
"rule," as understood by him, becomes even more obvious. In 9. 4. 1-2, the
study of compositio, which includes at once ordo, iunctura, numerus,
"order, connexion and rhythm" (9. 4. 22), places the author in a vicinity
closer than ever to the overpowering figure of Cicero. Therefore a critical
caveat seems appropriate: "I shall deal more briefly with those points which
admit of no dispute, while there will be certain subjects on which I shall
express a certain amount of disagreement." In short, "I intend to make my
own views clear" (9. 4. 2). What Quintilian does not observe is that his
notion of regula is one of the most significant features of his independent
thinking in the final part of the Institutio.
First, he launches a vibrant protest against those "who would absolutely
bar all study of artistic structure (curam omnem compositionis) and contend
that language as it chances to present itself in the rough is more natural and
even more manly" (9. 4. 3). Against such a contestation of all cultural
traditions, Quintilian underlines the fact that the adverse opinion, if ever
admitted as true, would mean the end of "the whole art of oratory." And he
gives his main reason: "For the first men did not speak with the care
demanded by that art nor in accordance with the rule that it lays down"
(Neque enim locuti sunt ad hanc regulam et diligentiam primi homines 9. 4.
4). Civilization, with rhetorical culture at its core, did not yet exist. The
regula, or human communication normed by compositio, in other words the
social institution of civilized language, was missing in the proto-history of
humankind. That ars loquendi developed only much later, when the birth of
civilized language became possible. Therefore, going back to the original
human beings, primi homines, would necessarily mean a collapse of all
cultural values.
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In Book 10, dealing with "imitation," Quintilian states that the use of
chosen words is normally determined by the perception of their traditional
value, "the one sure standard being contemporary usage" (ut quorum
certissima sit regula in consuetudine 10. 2. 13). A living tradition in its
present shape rules all educated language, and the creative process which
underlies the latter is said to be a certissima regula. Quintilian himself
illustrates the process of creating one's own language in conformity with
tradition. When distinguishing between "what is expedient" and "what is
becoming," he notes: "I have followed rather the usage of common speech
than the strict law of truth" {Et nos secundum communem potius loquendi
consuetudinem quam ipsam ueritatis regulam diuisione hac utimur 11.1.
12). During the fourth century C.E., an anonymous contemporary of
Tyconius would pick up the phrase ueritatis regula and give it creedal
relevance in his Latin translation of Irenaeus of Lyons's Aduersus
haereses}^ Tyconius himself used it as equivalent to regula fidei.
Finally, Book 12 includes a last mention of Quintilian's regula: "On
the other hand, the written speech which is published as a model of style
must be polished and filed and brought into conformity with the accepted
rule and standard of artistic construction {ad legem et regulam compositum
esse opportere), since it will come into the hands of learned men" (12.
10. 50).
Thus, throughout the Instiiutio, Quintilian witnesses a consistent usage
of regula: The "rule" is always in one way or another the logical
foundation and intrinsic principle of educated speech, oral or written. The
author of the Institutio refers to that "rule" always in the singular. He
acknowledges it as a source of discernment and distinctive correctness,
which transcends the actual speaker or writer. He states that it is universally
available all through the centuries, being one of those categories without
which no educated communication between people would ever happen.
It should not be seen as fortuitous that Quintilian recurs to the notion of
regula only in Books 1 and 9-12. Without making a proper statement about
it, his very usage of the notion shows that he gives it the value of a basic
hermeneutical concept, capable of enriching the logical frame of his whole
work.*^
'* S. Lundstrom, Studien zur laleinischen Irendusubersetzung (Lund 1943) and "Text-
kritische Beitrage zur laleinischen Irenausiibersetzung," Eranos 43 (1945) 285-300.
According to H. Jordan and A. Souler, as quoted by J. Quasten, Patrology I (1986; 1st ed.
1950) 290-91, the Latin translation of Irenaeus was made in Roman Africa between 370 and
420.
^^ Regula is not registered in E. Zundel, Clavis Quintilianea: Quinlilians "Institutio
oratoria" aufgeschliisselt nach rhetorischen Begriffen (Darmstadt 1989), but ratio is noted (p.
83). G. Kennedy (above, note 8) 58 traces scienlia (in Quintilian's basic definition of rhetoric:
"the science of speaking well" 2. 15. 34) back to the Stoics Qeanthes and Chrysippus, but
neglects the semantic constellation ratio, regula, scientia, in Quintilian himself.
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II. Tyconius's Regulae Mysticae
A "lay theologian and biblical commentator of the Donatist church of
Roman Africa,"^ ^ Tyconius flourished between 370 and 390. His
intellectual endeavor concentrated on the riches of the local Christianity in
Carthage. In line with Tertullian and Cyprian he deepened the properly
African self-definition of the Christian church, with the paradoxical aim to
free his church from sectarian isolation. i"* A Donatist by family status and
social conformity, he fought an endless battle in order to reintegrate the
schismatic African tradition into mainstream Christianity, with the only
result that he was severely censured by his own bishop, Parmenian of
Carthage, in 378,^^ and ridiculed about fifty years later, by Augustine, in
Book 3, chapter 42 of De doctrina Christiana. His works, despite the
damnatio memoriae engineered by Augustine and his friends, exercised a
long-lasting influence through the Western Middle Ages.^^ A commentary
on the Apocalypse by Tyconius survives only in fragments and quotations
from later authors.^^ Tyconius's most striking work. The Book of Rules,
handed down to us, it seems, in its integrality, was deliberately neutralized
by the elderly Augustine, when quoting it in the final part of De doctrina
Christiana 3. Thus deliberately taken out of Christian hands through its
biased quotation by this vigilant guardian of church orthodoxy, and de facto
reduced to a forgotten relic, Tyconius's Book of Rules offers the oldest
systematic essay on biblical hermeneutics ever written by a Christian
theologian.'*
Tyconius himself introduces it as a libellus regularis. Such a use of
regularis was apparently unknown before him. It announces in any case
that "rules" are the central, I should say, the unique issue at stake in the
book. There are seven "mystic rules," the author explains, which determine
a sound understanding of Uie divine revelation contained in the bible. Like
the seven "seals," which kept the heavenly book closed in Revelation 5. 1,
the seven "rules," according to Tyconius, hide and preserve from profane
reading the biblical message about God's deeds in the history of Israel and
'^ P. Bright (above, note 6) 917.
'* The reception and interpretation of the bible in Roman Africa is currently subjected to
intense research. Between studies on the so-called Vetus Lalina, the Latin text of the bible
older than Jerome's Vulgate, and work accomplished on Donatism (mainly in the field of
literary history by P. Monceaux and in a socio-political perspective by W. H. C. Frend), the
hermeneutical tradition which culminated in Tyconius still represents a terra incognita.
'^ Bishop of Carthage 362-391/2. See W. H. C. Frend's entry on Parmenian in Encyclo-
pedia ofthe Early Church (above, note 6) 11 651.
^* P. Cazier, "Le Livre des Regies de Tyconius. Sa transmission du 'De doctrina Christiana'
aux 'Sentences' d'Isidore de Seville," Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 19 (1973) 241-61 and
"Cassien auteur presum6 de I'epitome des Regies de Tyconius," 21 (1975) 261-97.
*' K. Steinhauser, The Apocalypse Commentary of Tyconius: A History of its Reception and
Influence (Frankfurt a.M., Bern and New York 1987).
'* Origen, On First Principles, Book 4, with which the Book of Rules is sometimes
compared, shows no intention of producing such a systematic hermeneutics.
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in view of universal human salvation. Only in applying the sort of initiatory
logic thought out by Tyconius would someone be able to interpret correctly
the divine message. I quote the preamble of The Book ofRules}^
Necessarium duxi ante omnia quae mihi uidentur libellum regularem
scribere, et secretorum legis ueluti claues et luminaria fabricare. sunt enim
quaedam regulae mysticae quae uniuersae legis recessus obtinent et
ueritatis thesauros aliquibus inuisibiles faciunt; quarum si ratio regularum
sine inuidia ut communicamus accepta fuerit, clausa quaeque patefient et
obscura dilucidabuntur, ut quis prophetiae immensam siluam perambulans
his regulis quodam modo lucis tramitibus deductus ab errore defendatur.
The seven "rules" are then enumerated as seven titles provided by
Tyconius for the different sections of his compact pamphlet: 1. De domino
et corpore eius, 2. De domini corpore bipartito, 3. De promissis et lege, 4.
De specie et genere, 5. De temporibus, 6. De recapitulatione, 7. De diabolo
et eius corpore. One may note at first glance that 1 and 7 secure a perfect
framing in being symmetrical. A closer look would admit the same for 2
and 6, as well as for 3 and 5, 4 being central, with the most explicit
reference to grammatical and logical categories, species and genus.
The whole work reflects the skills of a trained rhetor. Rules 1 and 2
display the author's inuentio; Tyconius explores the complex reality of the
church at large. In the light of the social body of the church he introduces
his main categories: scriptura, regula, transitus, recessus. It may be worth
remembering that the first part of Aristotle's Rhetoric was filled with
statements about society at large, past and present. Statements ijsed for
forensic communication were conveniently elaborated on the basis of the
social context. Rule 3 completes the inuentio of 1 and 2 in an
argumentative way. The moral institutions of repromissio and lex, as found
throughout scripture, turn Tyconius' s analysis into a more psychological
study. Hence Rule 3 deals with the inner experience of church people,
namely their passions, memories and expectations, along the centuries of
biblical and ecclesiastical history. A similar turn had happened in
Aristotle's Rhetoric, where the psychological behavior of people was
constantly mentioned in order to explain and legitimate juridical procedures.
Thus Rule 3 intends to prove the legitimacy of the social body of the church
in the history of salvation.
''
"Above everything else that came to mind, I considered it necessary to write a book of
rules and so to fashion keys and lamps, as it were, to the secrets of the law. For there are
certain mystic rules which obtain in the inner recesses of the entire law and keep the rich
treasures of the truth hidden from some people. But if the sense of these rules is accepted
without ill will, as we impart it, whatever is closed will be opened and whatever is dark will be
illumined; and anyone who walks the vast forest of prophecy guided by these rules, as by
pathways of light, will be kept from straying into error" (W. S. Babcock, Tyconius. The Book of
Rules, translated, with an introduction and notes, SBL Texts and Translations 31, Early
Christian Literature Series 7 [AUanta 1989] 3).
246 IlUnois Classical Studies 19 (1994)
Rule 4 could well be entitled separately "On Style." It belongs to a
genre of rhetorical essays popular in late antiquity. Here the way of writing
under consideration is attributed to the divine Spirit, the sole author of
sacred scripture admitted by Tyconius. The Spirit hides genus in species
when speaking of old and new Jerusalem, of old Israel and universal church:
in speciem genus abscondens. As an additional insight Quintilian had also
recommended that one observe carefully in a narrative the shifts between
specific and generic notions. Both, the Roman rhetor of the first century
C.E. and the African Donatist of the fourth century, underline the "subtlety"
of such procedures.^
Rule 5, "On Times," adds a classical chapter on ornamentation of style,
with a rhetorical definition as its introductory statement: "Temporis
quantitas in scripturis frequenter mystica est tropo synecdoche, aut legitimis
numeris, qui multis modis positi sunt et pro loco intelligendi; synecdoche
uero est aut a parte totum, aut a toto pars."^^ Rule 6, in direct continuity
with 5, tracks down another "subtlety" of the Spirit, when speaking of
"then" and "now": "The seal of recapitulation guards some things with
such subtlety that it seems more a continuation than a recapitulation of the
narrative."22 Additional remarks on analogy and allegory complete Rule 6.
Rule 7, aiming at a deliberate inclusion, parallels Rule 1: "The relation of
the devil and his body can be conceived in short order, if we keep in mind
here also what we have said about the Lord and his body."^^ This final
chapter has more than twice the length of the preceding one, and it is longer
than 1, 2 or 5. It adds to 6 and 7 a few more remarks on allegorical and
symbolic forms of speech in scripture. In short, the last three "rules" enjoy
a continuity of their own.
When Tyconius announced an "essay on rules" in his carefully crafted
preamble, he had in mind what he called "mystic rules," regulae mysticae.
But "mystic" did not imply any subjective experience due to those rules; it
referred to the objective and proper nature of the "rules" themselves. They
were in Tyconius's view divine revelation instituted and made available in a
given literary way, exclusively characteristic of scripture. They were
constitutive of the grammar assumed by the Spirit, when articulating divine
truth in sacred scripture; or, in borrowing Quintilian's terms, they were the
seven-fold ratio, or regula loquendi, exclusively proper to the biblical
message. Their affinity with Quintilian's regula rests essentially on their
^ In 4. 5. 25 {quo subtilius et copiosius diuisisse uideantur), Quintilian links "subtlety" with
the use of the distinction between genus and species. In 7. 1. 59 {qui subtiliter quaeret),
"subtlety" is recommended for a correct perception of the ordo between genus and species.
^'
"Temporal quantity, in scripture, often has mystic significance through the rhetorical
figure of synecdoche, or through the specific numbers involved. The latter are used in a variety
of ways and must be understood according to the context. In synecdoche, however, either a
part represents the whole or the whole represents a part" (Babcock [above, note 19] 89).
"Babcock (above, note 19) 109.
^ Babcock (above, note 19) 1 15.
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objectivity. Just as human language keeps being established in its own
"correctness, lucidity and elegance" throughout ages and cultures in
constant change, so does sacred scripture keep the integral truth of its
message, from David's day in biblical antiquity to "now" in Roman Africa,
thanks to "mystic rules" which regulate its ageless relevance.
No literal dependency, not even a literary resemblance, could be
claimed as linking Quintilian's work and the libellus of Tyconius. But the
latter's approach to scripture, conditioned as it was by the cultural
consensus in fourth-century Roman Africa, was thought out entirely in
terms of rhetoric. Tyconius needed to elaborate a theoretical construct
regulating scriptural interpretation in the light of burning issues proper to
the African tradition. He conceived his libellus regularis with such a
concern in mind.
The Tyconian "rules" are allegedly fixed by the Spirit of scriptural
inspiration for the very composition of scripture as handed down to the
churches, scripture being entirely conceived and even written out by the
Spirit in Tyconius's hermeneutics. In other words, the "rules" are inner,
structural principles, which belong to the very core of scriptural literature.
Well understood, those principles make the whole of scripture become
intelligible. They are objective criteria, bound to the letter of scripture
itself. The interpreter discovers them there. He or she would never invent
them as a subjective method of interpreting, because they originate only
from the Spirit's own initiative as the divine author of sacred scripture. The
interpreter perceives and unfolds the "rules" in the best of cases, thanks to
appropriate hermeneutical tools, like those furnished by Tyconius's Hbellus.
Those tools are essentially notions taken over from the traditional
curriculum of rhetoric. In the metaphorical announcement of his preamble
quoted above, Tyconius needed ueluti claues et luminaria fabricare, "to
fashion keys and lamps," in order to explore "the secrets of the law."-^"*
What sort of rhetorical notions were those "keys and lamps" in fact?
For catching the proper significance of Rule 1, Tyconius uses as "keys"
the notions of persona and transitus. For Rule 2, "Concerning the Bipartite
Character of the Lord's Body," he recommends another transitus, no longer
vertical, but "the transition (transitus) and return (reditus) from one part of
the body to the other, from Uie right-hand part to the left, or from the left to
the right." The second rule by itself signifies that the church is bipartite, but
in order to find this truth in scripture one must apply systematically the
bilateral transitus exemplified here. Rule 3 opens the clear understanding of
"the promises and the law," if only one applies correctly the handbook
notion of "the matter" under scrutiny, or as Tyconius calls it insistently, the
^ Babcodc's translation, "so to fashion keys and lamps," suggests an equivalency of "rales"
and "keys": "I considered it necessary to write a book of rales and so . . ." Nothing in the
Latin calls for "so," whereas ueluti, which qualifies properly claues et luminaria, is well
rendered by Babcock's "as it were."
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opus: Omne opus nostrum fides est.^ In using now properly that notion of
the narrative matter, one may read correctly, with the assistance of the
Spirit, what mattered for God on the distinctive levels of the law and of the
promises.
The chapter entitled "Rule 4" is introduced by the significant
observation: "De specie et genere loquimur, non secundum artem
rhetoricam humanae sapientiae . . . sed loquimur secundum mysteria
caelestis sapientiae magisterio Spiritus Sancti."^^ Thus the grammatical
notions of species and genus serve here for the enlightening exercise of
Rule 4, which reveals how the Spirit is "concealing the general in the
particular" (in speciem genus abscondens) or, vice versa, "how he passes
from the particular to the general''^^ {ab specie in genus), "thanks to a
variety of transition and order" (uarietas translationis et ordinis). Tyconius
calls expressly "spiritual" the secret realities revealed in Rule 4 (omnia
spiritualiter). Again Rule 5 is introduced by a technical remark, abeady
mentioned above: "Temporis quantitas in scripturis frequenter mystica est
tropo synecdoche." In applying the notion of "synecdoche," which means
that "either a part represents the whole or the whole represents a part,"
Tyconius uses another "key," able to deliver the ratio of what he calls the
"mystical significance" of "temporal quantity" which would otherwise be
kept secret by Rule 5.
Finally, the ratio of Rule 5, cleared up by the appropriate key-notion of
synecdoche, develops into a brilliant and rather complex arithmology, by
which one may try to compute and analyse the "mystical quantity" of many
periods of time in the Old Testament It looks as if Tyconius anticipated
here Augustine's numerological arguments. But the backgrounds of both
men are very different; in the case of Augustine it is philosophical, in the
case of Tyconius it is properly theological with a symbolic ecclesiology as
its focus.
Rule 6 calls for the rhetorical notion of "recapitulation" as its proper
key, being a rule "by which the Spirit has sealed the law so as to guard the
pathway of light,"^^ especially on the level of biblical narratives. The
subtlety (subtilitas) of the Spirit^^ uses grammatical means (tunc, ilia hora,
illo die) or, in Tyconius' s -words, futurae similitudines, which one would
hardly notice, so that the narrative seems simply to continue instead of
^ Babcock (above, note 19) 34.
^
"I am not referring to the particular and the general as they are used in the rhetorical art
devised by human wisdom. Rather I am speaking with reference to the mysteries of heavenly
wisdom in relation to the teaching of the Holy Spirit" (Babcock [above, note 19] 55). As
"rhetorical art devised by human wisdom" Babcock recalls in note 12 "Quintilian InstUutio
Oratorica [sic] 7. 1. 23-28." The translator in the Loeb Library could have suggested to him
that he keep species and genus, instead of using "particular" and "general," which lose
Tyconius's express reference to defined notions of grammar.
^ In Babcock's unfortunate translation.
^ Babcock (above, note 19) 109.
^' See above, note 19.
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being "recapitulation." By this term "recapitulation" Tyconius introduces
an interpretive key, which opens the correct meaning, prophetic and
"spiritual" as it was, of many biblical narratives. Indeed, by the very fact of
telling stories about the patriarchs or other figures in the Old Testament,
those narratives announce secretly the present truth of the church. The key
proper to Rule 6 "recapitulates" the narratives in "actualizing" them
explicitly in the light of current church experience: "What Daniel
mentioned is hapj)ening now in Africa."^®
Rule 7 concerns the teaching of the bible about Antichrist. More than
the other six rules it is eschatological. Its mysteries are brought into
daylight by the same key used akeady for Rule 1: Transitus namque a
capite ad corpus eadem ratione dinoscitur, "The transition^' from head to
body is recognized by the same kind of reasoning." Precisely there is an
Antichrist because the "devil's body" signifies the reality of evil inside the
"body of Christ," and in proportion with it. This last rule in Tyconian
hermeneutics keeps hidden the true nature of the "bipartite" church: It is "in
the midst" of Christianity, spread over the world, that evil culminates.
In summary, the seven regulae, described by Tyconius in his libellus
regularis, are as objective and essential in regard to God's biblical discourse
as seemed to be for human speech the regula loquendi identified by
Quintilian. They are declared mysticae precisely because they command the
very nature of the divine discourse in scripture. More needs to be said about
the "mystic" nature of the Tyconian rules.^^ Here the analogy with
Quintilian's regula called only for a precision about their objective
structuring inside scripture. A final clarification about them is unwillingly
given by Augustine, to whom we owe in fact the miraculous preservation of
Tyconius 's amazing libellus regularis.
III. Augustine's /?cgu/ae uel Claues
Augustine's journey, from the day when he left Carthage for Rome until the
day of his retum to Roman Africa as a Christian convert, tells us the story of
a fascinating quest for the truth and the very nature of human language, a
quest determined mainly by the sort of Neoplatonic philosophy absorbed by
Augustine in Milanese circles, and foremost by his inveterate need to trust
in divine transcendency for solving his personal problems. As a
professional rhetor he could have reached true enjoyment and security in
cultivating a critical pursuit of what human language represents. He chose
to give priority to the disrupting trends of his religious quest. His whole
'° Babcock (above, note 19) 1 1 1.
^' Transitus, with an active sense, implies in Tyconius a deliberate transfer of meaning from
one reality to another. If one translates it by "transition," one may well miss the proper sense
of the term in the Book of Rules. Quintilian used it in the more common way {wide etiam
uenusti transitusfiunt 9. 2. 61) when commenting on Cicero's oratorical style.
I hope to fulfill this task in a Handbook ofPatristic Exegesis, in preparation for Brill.
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awareness about the vital gift of language turned into what he called
"confessions." It also called for a more theoretical assessment which he
entitled De doctrina Christiana, the "doctrine" in question focusing on the
divine message of scripture as it takes on the form of human language and
as it calls for a critical understanding articulated in one's own culture.
When quoting Tyconius and his Book ofRules in a later section of his
own hermeneutical essay, Augustine relies on an experience thirty years
before, still vivid in his memory and most probably well retraceable for him
on the basis of his notebooks. In 396 he had apologized in a letter to Bishop
Aurelius of Carthage {Ep. 41. 2): "On my part, I am not forgetting what
you asked about the seven rules or keys of Tyconius, and as I have written
many times, I am waiting to hear what you think of it." Indeed, during one
of the earliest encounters between Augustine and Aurelius, after
Augustine's return to Africa, most probably after 395, when the famous
rhetor had become the assistant of Bishop Valerius in Hippo Regia, the
primate of Carthage found it very convenient to lend a copy of Tyconius's
libellus to his newly appointed and subordinate colleague, who was indeed
more qualified than anyone else to give him a competent opinion.
To his surprise Aurelius found the learned Augustine at a loss after
having read the libellus regularis of the Donatist lay theologian. He never
received the easy information which he had expected, but when he heard
that the newly appointed bishop of Hippo intended to write a complete
essay on rules for interpreting scripture, entitled De doctrina Christiana, he
hoped that Augustine's response to Tyconius's essay on the same issue
would finally come out. His disappointment must have been real when he
realized that the zealous and passionate new pastor of Hippo had interrupted
his hermeneutical tractate and postponed its completion ad kalendas
graecas. Finally, when getting a hand on a copy of what had in fact been
written out of that tractate, he suspected more than by a simple guess that
the unfortunate interruption was precisely due to Augustine's puzzlement
about the Tyconian "rules." Indeed, thirty years later, in 426, almost a
decade after Aurelius 's death, the old bishop of Hippo decided to review as
many as a hundred or so of his literary works, and to add to them a list of
retractationes. In the unique case of De doctrina Christiana he went so far
as to decide to complete the essay according to its original plan, as
announced at the start of its first book. He wrote out the missing section at
the end of Book 3, the one which had caused his literary inhibition in 396;
then he felt free to secure the composition of Book 4.^3
^^ See my remarks on the "Local Setting and Motivation of De doctrina Christiana," in
Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine, Presbyter Factus Sum, ed. by J. T. Lienhard, E. C.
MuUer and R. J. Teske (New York 1993) 331-39, and on "The Interrupted De doctrina
Christiana," in Augustine of Hippo. De doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture, ed.
by D. W.-H. Arnold and P. Bright (Notre Dame 1995).
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In 3. 25, 36 through 29. 41, the seventy-two year old bishop succeeded
in completing the discussion of "figurative locutions" with variable
significations. He also added some remarks about tropes. Any reader
would be aware of a certain change of style and vocabulary, even a deeper
richness in the references to scripture, in comparing that final section of
Book 3 with its former parts. One would be right in attributing the change
to the author's more profound experience of scripture after three decades of
intense studying and preaching. But a more specific explanation becomes
possible from 3. 30. 42 on, where Augustine introduces his quotation of
Tyconius. One needs only to read the work of Tyconius, which completely
occupies the final section of De doctrina Christiana 3, from 30. 42 through
37. 56, in order to see that the changed tone and the more technical
argumentation from 25. 36 through 29. 41 anticipate in all details the
subsequent statements about Tyconius in the rest of Book 3. To state it
bluntly, it is with the Tyconian Book of Rules in mind that the old bishop
engaged the completion oiDe doctrina Christiana in 426.
Does it mean that Augustine had at last overcome the initial inhibition
which had prevented him from discussing Tyconius in his hermeneutical
tractate thirty years earlier? One can hardly doubt it, in observing the
magisterial tone with which Augustine not only quotes the Book of Rules,
but even celebrates its merits, and insists that students of scripture should
learn from it. A positive treatment given to the work of a schismatic
teacher, who deserves only to be despised or at least ignored by anyone who
cares for ecclesiastic orthodoxy, remains unparalleled in the whole of
patristic literature.
In fact, Augustine's behavior is far from simple. At the time of his
Retractationes, he no longer hesitated to introduce Tyconius in the frame of
his incomplete De doctrina Christiana, to quote him and to summarize his
whole libellus. For Augustine was now armed with his own arsenal of
biblical proof-texts, the result of manifold and exacting exercises in
scriptural exegesis. In his summarizing paraphrase of each of Tyconius's
rules, he found it normal and legitimate to replace the Tyconian apparatus of
scriptural references by his own. In doing so he projected into that
paraphrase his own understanding of scripture, church and Christian
identity. As a result, the same Augustine, who contributed more than
anyone else to preserving the very text and memory of Tyconius's libellus
for centuries to come, "failed to understand the very purpose of the Book of
Rules as well as the hermeneutical theory that lay behind it."^
In 396, writing to Aurelius of Carthage, the young bishop of Hippo
complained about his own failure to catch the meaning of Tyconius's
"seven rules or keys" {septem regulis uel clauibus). In 426, the same
^* For a thorough analysis of Augustine's quotation, see P. Bright, "Tyconius and his
Interpreters: A Study of the Epitomes of the Book of Rules," in Kannengiesser and Bright
(above, note 9) 23-39, esp. 37.
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bishop, in the final stage of his prodigious career, introduced at last the
adversary whom he could not help but acclaim as a master, by the words:
"A certain Tyconius . . . wrote a book which he called of Rules, since in it
he explained seven rules with which as with keys (emphasis mine) the
obscurities of the divine scriptures might be opened." The quoted preamble
of the liber regularum^^ follows almost immediately, with the explicit
mention of the "regulae mysticae quae universae legis recessus obtinent et
ueritatis thesauros aliquibus inuisibilis faciunt." Following Augustine's
introductory remarks in 3. 30. 42 ("rules with which, as with keys, the
obscurities of the divine scriptures might be opened"), the manuscript
tradition manipulated the wording of Tyconius 's prooemium, and all
modern translations until very recently agreed with D. W. Robertson, Jr.,
who translated: "For there are certain mystic rules which reveal (for
obtinent \) what is hidden in the whole Law and make visible (for invisibilis
faciuntl) the treasures of truth which are invisible to some."
Thus, from Tyconius's "rules," considered as the vital structure of
scriptural discourse, in analogy with Quintilian's "rule" which was the
establishing principle of educated language, the focus has shifted over, in
De doctrina Christiana, to Augustinian hermeneutics determined by
Ciceronian praecepta.
Concordia University, Montreal
^^ Augustine cites Tyconius's essay as liber regularum, whereas the latter introduced it as
libellus regularis. The translators render libellus regularis by "Book of Rules."
